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Abstract
This paper analyzes the supply of status using data on the attractiveness ratings for the
World Cup 2010 athletes from the social networking website BeautifulPeople.com. Treating the
data as a team-player panel, the 32 country xed e¤ects are positively associated with GDP per
capita. Furthermore, there is no obvious correlation between each countrys GDP per capita
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1 Introduction
People engage in conspicuous consumption as a means to signal their wealth, which in turn, confers
social status. Status provides society its hierarchical structure and has an intimate role in corporate
charity, housing, luxury goods, branding strategies, marriage markets and career outcomes. In
general, the implications of social status are profound1, as they a¤ect which members of society
receive priority access to resources, and have the most inuence on important social policies. Much
of the theoretical literature has developed and extended Veblens (1899) framework2, while empirical
work has been primarily focused on uncovering behavior consistent with conspicuous consumption3.
This paper takes a step back and asks a more fundamental question: Is there actually a link between
(subjective) social status and wealth? One can think of examples that suggest a link may not
really exist. For instance, a fashion model has a higher social status than her photographer, even
though the photographer may make more money than her; and a University professor eating at a
McDonalds has a higher social status than the stores operator, even though the operator likely
earns more money4.
Answering this question is not trivial, because subjective measures of social status are hard to
come by. However, the latest marketing e¤ort by the social networking website BeautifulPeople.com
during the Fédération Internationale de Football Associations (FIFA) 2010 World Cup provides
us a unique opportunity to evaluate the association between wealth and social status. We are
motivated by von Rueden, Gurven and Kaplans (2008) study that attempts to identify predictors
of male status from their photos. They focus on a community which lacks material wealth, and
instead, relies on hunters for sustenance. Us, on the other hand, focus on how the developed world
views these international players.
BeautifulPeople.com recently asked the general public to rate the attractiveness, on a scale of 1
to 10, of all the active players in this years tournament. This measure provides us a social status
1The failure to achieve status has been used to explain the high suicide rates in South Korea (The Economist,
2010).
2Veblens work was formalized by Bagwell and Bernheim (1996). Extensions of the standard conspicuous consump-
tion model: dynamics (Friendman and Ostrov, 2008); implications on growth (Corneo and Jeanne, 1999); poverty
traps in the presence of conspicuous consumption (Moav and Neeman, 2010); strategic consumption (Hopkins and
Kornienko, 2004); and taxation of conspicuous goods (Corneo and Jeane, 1997).
3Some notable examples include: purchase decisions for cosmetics (Chao and Schor, 1996); implications of "Veblen
e¤ects" on work hours (Bowles and Park, 2005); investment in art that yields negative returns (Mandel, 2009);
consumption of visible goods among African-Americans (Charles, Hurst and Roussanov, 2009); a taxonomy of those
who do and do not purchase quiet/loud brand-name products (Han, Nunes and Dreze, 2010); and whether Black
students "act white" á la academic achievement as a means to gain status (Fryer Jr and Torelli, 2010).
4These examples draw from the sociological idea of status inconsistency - a lack of correlation between di¤erent
proxies of status, such as those based on socioeconomic background and prestige.
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proxy for how the public (from English speaking and developed nations) perceives each player. We
do not, however, try to evaluate the e¤ect of each players salary on his perceived attractiveness,
as a majority of these players belong to professional teams and are paid well above their countrys
average citizens. Instead, we control for player specic attributes, which in turn allows us to
estimate country specic e¤ects on a players attractiveness. The xed e¤ect is interpreted as a
countrys social status, since it reects the publics overall view of each teams attractiveness. With
these estimates, we are able to see that GDP per capita has a signicant and positive e¤ect on
a countrys social status, even after controlling for the countrys FIFA ranking, level of income
inequality and number of internet users.
Furthermore, we nd no obvious statistical relationship between each countrys GDP per capita
and its FIFA ranking. Since each countrys performance is not directly related to wealth, one
cannot say that GDP per capita is only associated with social status through performance. The
relationship between these two variables appears to be more direct, which supports the Veblen view
that their relationship is rather intimate.
This "beauty contest" allows the public to stratify and rank the population of World Cup
soccer players5. Because the attractiveness of World Cup athletes is essentially a (subjective) social
ranking, we are studying the supply of status6. Most of the empirical and theoretical literature
focuses on the incentives behind conspicuous consumption, or as one may put it, the demand for
status. A typical reduced form model for the demand for status has an agent choosing the optimal
amount of visible consumption so as to signal his or her wealth to others. How an open society
awards this status is often opaque, and assumed to depend (almost exclusively) to inferred income
conditional of observed consumption patterns7. Although this paper does not make the supply of
status completely transparent, it does o¤er evidence suggestive that expected income is not the
only driver; most notably, we nd that age and race a¤ect each players individual status, while
a teams ability (as measured by its ranking) as well as whether it wins/loses a game have non-
negligible e¤ects on each countrys status. By collecting the attractiveness ratings before and after
the pinnacle Bronze/Gold medal matches on July 10 and 11, 2010, we can identify a "di¤erences-
in-di¤erences" treatment e¤ect of winning/losing for Germany, Netherlands, Spain and Uruguay.
5The voting was initially restricted to BeautifulPeople.com members, but later opened up to the general public.
6By its literal denition, status is the "the relative rank that an individual holds, with attendant rights, duties,
and lifestyle, in a social hierarchy based upon honour or prestige. Status may be ascribed that is, assigned to
individuals at birth without reference to any innate abilities or achieved, requiring special qualities and gained
through competition and individual e¤ort." (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2010)
7An exception is the theoretical work on ways in which to organize hierarchys in society through the use of
centralized market mechanisms, such as contests held within organizations. See Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2007) for
further details and a list of relevant literature.
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These e¤ects show that Spains status increased after winning the Gold medal, while Netherlands
and Uruguays status fell after losing their Gold and Bronze medal games respectively.
Our work is most similar to recent research conducted by Swami and Hernandez (2010), who
asked 461 London residents to provide subjective ratings about the attractiveness of women and
men in Londons 33 boroughs8. The most distinguishing feature of our work is that we look at the
aggregate attractiveness ratings for individuals, and then, after controlling for individual character-
istics, assess the relationship between country e¤ects with socioeconomic variables. Nevertheless,
our results are in line with theirs: income and attractiveness are related. Our richer specication
allows us to identify this relationship more convincingly, as well as demonstrate non-exclusivity
between attractiveness and income. Furthermore, the attractiveness rating we employ received a
lot of media attention, which may have led to a large number of participants, thereby making each
players rating close to being representative of how society views them9.
Matching markets are to some extent nested within the idea of social hierarchies. The matching
mechanism requires that males and females provide preferences for the other gender. With these
preferences, stable matches can be made. With that in mind, the work by Hitsch, Hortacsu and
Ariely (2010) is relevant. They use online dating data to identify intrinsic horizontal and vertical
qualities that males and females care about when deciding whether to reach out to their matches.
Among their many results, they nd that income matters. However, they concede that the estimated
mate preferences may not be representative of the general public. Given the amount of publicity
surrounding BeautifulPeople.coms World Cup "Beauty Contest," we are less willing to make the
same concession, as the number of people who provide their input is likely to be large10.
2 Data
During the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, a social networking online community, BeautifulPeo-
ple.com11 sponsored a survey to seek out the public opinion about the attractiveness of all the
players12. Initially, voting was restricted to BeautifulPeople.com members. Eventually, anyone was
8Their work builds on OReilly et. al. (2006), who study how general practitioners perceive the attractiveness of
their patients based on socioeconomic backgrounds. A similar study that looks at the determinants of community
attractiveness also nds that wealthier communities are more attractive (Lekwa, Rice and Hibbing, 2007).
9For example, see http://www.hu¢ ngtonpost.com/2009/11/12/beautifulpeoplecom-brits_n_355226.html. The
attractiveness online survey generated a lot of attention largely because it identied the ugliest player to be Wayne
Rooney (of Britain).
10We have requested more detailed statistics from BeautifulPeople.com.
11As the name suggests, this online community requires that members exceed some level of perceived attractiveness,
as determined by the opposite gender of existing members. To that end, some have called this site as being elitist.
12There are 11 players for each of the 32 teams. Note that the attractiveness for the substitutes is not probed from
BeautifulPeople.com.
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allowed to enter a score between 1 to 10 for any player without signing up for an account. These
scores are averaged and displayed on a page that compiles the aggregate ratings for each individual.
On average, the ratings are quite low; most are below 5. We recorded these scores on two separate
dates: July 9, 2010 and July 12, 2010. In between those dates were the Bronze and Gold medal
matches, Germany versus Uruguay and Netherlands versus Spain respectively. In the end, Ger-
many beat Uruguay, while Spain beat Netherlands. The distribution of attractiveness scores does
not change much before and after the nals. The distributions of ratings across countries indicates
that the mean and variance of attractiveness varies across countries. For example, Argentina has a
fairly uniform distribution of scores, while South Africas scores are largely concentrated around 4.
We supplement this data with player specic characteristics, as well as country specic charac-
teristics. Some factors that may play a role in each players attractiveness may be divided into two
categories: 1) physical features, and 2) performance. To control for variation in physical features,
we use a scientic measure of attractiveness developed by Atama Group13. Their freely available
application allowed us to upload each players photo and get a score that depends on whether the
proportions of the face are "ideal," where ideal is based on past experimental research. A high
score is assigned to faces with desirable proportions. The score ranges from as low as 5.26 to as
high as 9.15, and the distribution of scores varies across countries. Other physical features need
to be controlled for. In addition to this beauty score, we also collected data on each players age,
race, height, and whether they have long hair14. To obtain the Anaface score, one has to carefully
place dots on key points of a photograph15.
The attractiveness rating may also depend on a players ability and amount of exposure. We
control for these attributes by collecting information about the number of games played, minutes,
goals, yellow and red cards during the 2010 tournament16. There is also information about each
players number of international caps17 and goals. On average, players entered the tournament
with quite a lot of professional experience, with an average number of 44.
To answer our main research question, we need some measure of the income of a represen-
tative member of each country. For that, we use the most recently (and widely) available GDP
13This application is available on the website http://apps.atamagroup.com/face/. We used the photos of players
provided by the o¢ cial FIFA World Cup 2010 homepage. These pictures were ideal as virtually all of the players had
the same pose.
14We dene hair as being long if they can cover the ears.
15There are concerns that the score changes depending on how the dots are placed. Note that both authors
separately obtained Anaface scores for the set of players. The results outlined below were nearly identical in every
way for both sets of Anaface scores. Therefore, only one set of scores are reported in the analysis.
16For those teams participating in the Bronze and Gold medal matches, their tournament stats will be slightly
di¤erent, as they played in one additional match.
17Jargon for the number of international games participated in prior to the tournament.
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per capita prior to 2010. Other controls include each the number of internet users, and the Gini
coe¢ cient18. From the histogram, we see that the GDP per capita has quite a large range, espe-
cially with North Korea and the United States in our sample. All of this information is obtained
from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook. GDP per capita has a positive, but
insignicant, relationship with the number of internet users, as one would expect, while GDP per
capitas relationship with the Gini coe¢ cient is signicantly close to zero.
As an added control, we include each teams FIFA ranking prior to entering the tournament
as an attempt to control for ability. The top team, Brazil, has a ranking of 1, while the worst
team, North Korea, has a ranking of 105. There are concerns that the ranking is largely driven by
how wealthy a country is. We nd that the relationship between wealth and ranking is statistically
insignicant.
3 Empirical framework
The rst step in our study is to identify the country level xed e¤ects. We accomplish this by
running the separate regressions for the level of attractiveness before and after the nal matches
Attractivenesstcp = +  Xtcp + !tc + "cp
where t 2 fBefore;Afterg, c is a country index, p = 1; :::; 11 is a player index, and Xtcp contains
player specic characteristics, such as those relating to physical traits and performance. Some of
the variables change before and after the nal matches for the four participating teams, such as the
total number of matches, total minutes played, goals, and penalties during the 2010 games. For all
other teams, XBeforecp = X
After
cp . Each countrys social status is captured by the xed e¤ect !
t
c.
Once we have estimated the intercept and coe¢ cients for Xtcp, we can back out !^
t
c, which is later
used in the following simple cross-sectional regression
!^tc =  + 1  log(GDP_per_capita)c + 2  FIFA_Rankingc + 3  Internetc + 4 Ginic + c
We control for a teams ability using Rankingc, the number of internet users using Internetc,
and level of equality using Ginic. If a particular country has a large number of internet users, then
there is a possibility that the countrys social status is high simply because of deterministic rating
behavior as a way to support their home team. We believe though that this should not be a large
concern, as the BeautifulPeople.com network caters primarily to English speaking users that reside
18This number measures the level of inequality in a country, 1 being he most inequal, and 0 being the most fair.
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in North America or England. Finally, the level of inequality may proxy for whether a country is
elitist or not. Countries with a large Gini coe¢ cient will have a small population of people holding
a majority of the income.
What we are interested in though is the parameter 1, which should be signicant and above
zero for our estimated model to be consistent with the standard Veblen assumption that related
wealth with status. An alternative specication is
!^tc = +1  log(GDP_per_capita_others)c+2 FIFA_Rankingc+3 Internetc+4 Ginic+c
where log(GDP_per_capita_others)c measures how wealthy all countries d 6= c are. In this
specication, we would expect 1 to be negative. The relative standing of country c will fall if the
income of other countries increases, if status is indeed related to wealth.
4 Results
There are three main drivers for an individual players attractiveness: age, whether the player is
black and the number of international games played. Older players are less appealing than their
younger counterparts, as some would expect. Age can make a player less popular for two reasons:
1) Appearance deteriorates with age; and/or 2) performance deteriorates with age. Surprisingly,
the Anaface score has a negative and insignicant relationship with subjective attractiveness. We
interpret this non-result as suggesting that the attractiveness ratings on BeautifulPeople.com cannot
be taken literally as "beauty contest" scores. Given that both males and females alike can rate the
players anonymously, whether or not a player is sexually appealing is not so relevant; especially
when some of the ratings are completed by heterosexual male soccer fans. Therefore, this subjective
measure should instead be thought of as some general proxy for each players fanfare (i.e. social
status). The negative e¤ect of age on a players status is similar to Hitsch, Hortacsu, and Arielys
(2010) nding that age of a mate is undesirable.
Being black also has a negative e¤ect on status. We are able to identify this e¤ect since there
are many non-African teams that have Black players. There are likely two explanations for this
result. We conjecture that a large number of participants who provide their input are not black;
and because race might be used as a horizontal attribute, participants nd those similar to them
more attractive. An alternative reason is North Americans and Europeans are accustomed to
"Caucasian" standards for what is beautiful. One way to see this is by regressing the Anaface score
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on a black dummy. This regression reveals that being black can signicantly reduce the Anaface
score by 0.3 points.
The nal result from our xed e¤ect estimations is that experienced players are perceived to be
more attractive. Players who have had a long career in professional football will most likely have
fans. Fans of a player will hold him in high regard, especially if these fans are loyal. We do not
believe this variable acts so much as a predictor of status, but instead, an important control that
must be employed. These fans have the potential of biasing the attractiveness ratings. By using
the information about each players experience prior to the 2010 World Cup, we can reduce some
of this bias.
These estimates are almost the same, regardless of whether we use the ratings from July 9, 2010,
or July 12, 2010. Within this short time frame, the reduced form preferences of the participants
on BeautifulPeople.com appear to be stable.
After the xed e¤ects regression, we are able to back out the country status e¤ects. A basic
plot of this estimated e¤ect against GDP per capita reveals an upward pattern. It is premature to
conclude that GDP per capita has a positive e¤ect on a countrys status, as those countries that
have positive status are among the top football teams, such as Brazil, Italy and Spain to name a
few. This pattern motivates us to include each teams FIFA ranking in our country-level regressions
on wealth. We also reiterate that wealth has an insignicant e¤ect on ranking. Wealth does not
seem to be the main force behind whether some teams are good or not. Therefore, whatever e¤ect
that wealth has on status is more likely to be a direct e¤ect, as opposed to a second order e¤ect
through the FIFA ranking.
The regressions show that income (and income of others) have a positive (negative) and sta-
tistically signicant association with status. Even with the FIFA rank included, the income e¤ect
does not disappear. Therefore, developed countries are viewed more favorable than their undevel-
oped counterparts. This result provides us the key evidence in favor of the underlying assumptions
behind theories and empirical work about conspicuous consumption. However, we cannot say that
income is the sole proxy for status. There is no obvious direction of causality for the relationship
between wealth and status. Because we use the GDP per capita prior to 2010, the current per-
ception about attractiveness should not have had an impact on the GDP per capita in the past
provided that the following qualication holds: current perception changes over time and is not
permanent.
Changing perception is certainly plausible. A well known example of this is highlighted by the
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experiences of Brazillian model Gisele Bündchen. In her early years, she had trouble nding work
due to the "thin-craze." In a matter of years, the "bombshell look" suddenly became the norm,
and Gisele marked "the return of the sexy model" with her appearance on the July 1999 Vogue
cover19. Shifting perception may also be driving the recent rise in interracial marriages between
certain mixes, such as marriages between black and white individuals (Lichter, Carmalt, and Qian,
2011). Because attractiveness changes over time, we believe that past GDP per capita in the past
is more likely to be causing the shifts in social status, rather than a persistent social perception
that a¤ects a countrys past value as a place for investment and economic activity.
Our estimates also reveal that the FIFA ranking plays a large role in whether or not a country
has status. Indeed, ability seems to matter in how the public views each team. This result holds in
all four specications listed. Much like the Amazonian tribe member, status is partly determined
by skill-related attributes. A natural follow up question is: if performance matters, then is there
an impact in winning/losing a crucial game?
To answer this question, we adopt a standard "di¤erences-in-di¤erences" approach. The events
that we are interested in are the bronze and gold medal games that took place on July 10 and 11.
Germany eventually beat Uruguay to take the bronze, while Spain beat Netherlands to take the
gold. Therefore, intuition dictates that Germany and Spains statuses improve, while Netherlands
and Uruguays statuses deteriorate between July 9 and July 12. It turns out that our conjecture
is only partially correct. We calculate the average treatment e¤ect of winning/losing a game by
nding suitable control countries for Germany, Netherlands, Spain and Uruguay; they are England,
Australia, France and Mexico respectively. These control countries were chosen on the basis of
closeness in terms of GDP per capita. To obtain the di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimate, we calculate
the change in status between the two sampling dates for the treated group, and control group. For
example, the change in status for Spain is -0.1, and the change in status for France is -0.21.
Therefore, the e¤ect of winning for Spain is -0.1-(-0.21)=0.11; which, is positive as one would
suspect. After calculating these numbers, we nd that the e¤ect of winning for Germany is
negative, and the e¤ects of losing for Uruguay and Netherlands are both negative. Aside from
Germany, the winning/losing e¤ects are what we expected ex ante.
19Refer to the article "The Bombshell is Back" by Fiorella Valdesolo in Flare (September, 2010).
9
5 Conclusion
Wealth and status are certainly related - a ubiquitous assumption in virtually all work that builds
on Veblen. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the rst to verify this claim. We fall
short of proving the direction of causality between these two variables, but provide an argument
in favor of (past) wealth a¤ecting social status. If our argument does not hold, then it could
be that underdeveloped countries are looked down upon because they are poor, or that low status
countries are poor because wealthy countries overlook them for economic trade. There are certainly
interesting implications either way.
If underdeveloped countries will be at the bottom of the social hierarchy; and to move up this
social ranking, these countries likely have to spend a lot on a countrys equivalent to conspicuous
consumption. One may say that games such as the Olympics and the World Cup are prime examples
of conspicuous consumption on a national scale. Critics often assert that these events bring little
benet and too much cost. Economic growth in these countries may slow if a large percentage
of their budget is allocated for these events. Therefore, their status signal can make them poorer
and ever more desperate to prove their worth in society. On the other hand, if a country with low
status is looked down upon, then that country may have to spend more e¤ort (and resources) to
convince other countries to invest in them; which may ultimately make them worse o¤ if they are
unsuccessful.
Given that there are over 300 players to rate, it is unreasonable to believe that each rater will
evaluate all of the players. Most likely, only a subset of players (or teams) will be evaluated by each
individual at any given moment. Our biggest concern is if individuals choose to rate players on a
team-by-team basis, depending on the country they themselves originate from. In this case, if we
get large blocks of individuals from a particular country rating a particular team, the xed e¤ects
may not be reective of how the entire population views these teams. That said, this observation
motivates future empirical work with richer data on the raters themselves, such as their countries
of origin and residence.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for individual players
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Attractiveness before nals 4.474 0.917 2.97 7.99
Attractiveness after nals 4.304 0.97 2.77 7.76
Anaface score 7.492 0.66 5.26 9.15
Long hair 0.105 0.307 0 1
Black 0.247 0.432 0 1
Age 28.023 3.802 20 40
Height 181.577 6.464 165 201
Matches before nals 2.866 1.58 0 6
Minutes before nals 225.56 154.726 0 570
Goals before nals 0.267 0.745 0 5
Yellow cards before nals 0.355 0.571 0 2
Red cards before nals 0.017 0.13 0 1
Matches after nals 2.969 1.732 0 7
Minutes after nals 234.895 170.491 0 660
Goals after nals 0.281 0.768 0 5
Yellow cards after nals 0.389 0.622 0 3
Red cards after nals 0.017 0.13 0 1
International caps 44.443 28.656 0 137
International goals 5.884 9.045 0 56
Midelder 0.281 0.45 0 1
Defender 0.381 0.486 0 1
Goalkeeper 0.094 0.292 0 1
N 352
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Table 2: Relationship between each players perceived attractiveness with his physical and perfor-
mance characteristics. Specication (1) uses the BeautifulPeople.com attractiveness ratings before
the Bronze/Gold medal matches, while specication (2) uses the ratings after the medal matches.
(1) (2)
Attractiveness before nals Attractiveness after nals
Anaface score -0.0175 (0.0689) -0.0201 (0.0676)
Long hair -0.156 (0.162) -0.188 (0.164)
Black -0.397 (0.160) -0.395 (0.151)
Age -0.0813 (0.0173) -0.0835 (0.0169)
Height 0.000612 (0.00886) 0.000572 (0.00861)
Midelder -0.106 (0.151) -0.0895 (0.153)
Defender -0.0259 (0.150) -0.0107 (0.148)
Goalkeeper 0.345 (0.196) 0.379 (0.205)
International caps 0.00420 (0.00196) 0.00454 (0.00191)
International goals 0.00875 (0.00698) 0.00941 (0.00728)
Matches before nals -0.0104 (0.0793)
Minutes before nals -0.000532 (0.000779)
Goals before nals 0.116 (0.0730)
Yellow cards before nals 0.271 (0.0801)
Red cards before nals 0.481 (0.428)
Matches after nals 0.0203 (0.0863)
Minutes after nals -0.000753 (0.000800)
Goals after nals 0.113 (0.0711)
Yellow cards after nals 0.241 (0.0733)
Red cards after nals 0.488 (0.404)
Constant 6.500 (1.751) 6.697 (1.717)
Observations 352 352
R2 0.1834 0.1847
Clustered standard errors by team in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
Table 3: Summary statistics for countries
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Country status before nal 0 0.58 -1.233 1.343
Country status after nal 0 0.478 -0.938 1.236
GDP per capita 20925 13987.591 1500 46400
Gini coe¢ cient 39.181 10.001 26 65
Internet users in country 23.496 43.478 0 231
FIFA ranking 26.031 23.886 1 105
N 32
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Table 4: Relationship between each countrys social status with its wealth. Specication (1) uses the
estimated social status for each country before the Bronze/Gold medal matches, while specication
(2) uses the social status after the medal matches.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before nal After nal Before nal After nal
log(GDP per capita) 0.204 0.174
(0.0710) (0.0589)
FIFA ranking -0.0119 -0.00811 -0.0124 -0.00874
(0.00333) (0.00263) (0.00331) (0.00280)
Internet users 0.00132 0.00173 0.000506 0.00144
(0.00149) (0.00124) (0.00193) (0.00166)
Gini coe¢ cient 0.00300 -0.00215 0.00640 -0.00120
(0.00842) (0.00759) (0.00953) (0.00905)
log(GDP per capita of others) -10.98 -7.661
(5.351) (4.652)
Constant -1.786 -1.412 147.0 102.8
(0.845) (0.742) (71.46) (62.07)
Observations 32 32 32 32
R2 0.5368 0.5316 0.5263 0.4924
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
Table 5: Change in status after medal matches
Country Win/Lose/No change Change in status Di¤erences-in-Di¤erences e¤ect
Australia No change 0.0084 
Germany Win 0.02 -0.26
England No change 0.046 
France No change -0.21 
Mexico No change 0.13 
Netherlands Lose -0.42 -0.4284
Spain Win -0.1 0.11
Uruguay Lose -.016 -0.03
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